[whatwg] Dealing with UI redress vulnerabilities inherent to the current web
mjs at apple.com
Tue Sep 30 03:36:04 PDT 2008
On Sep 29, 2008, at 9:42 PM, Ian Hickson wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Sep 2008, Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
>> On Sep 28, 2008, at 3:32 AM, Robert O'Callahan wrote:
>>> I'm suggesting just reusing the Access Controls spec for that.
>>> So for example, the server could say:
>>> Same-Origin-Only-Unless-Access-Controls-Says-Otherwise: yes
>>> Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://example.com
>> I think this is a really good proposal. It would allow Web sites to
>> place all content under a single uniform policy for access control,
>> opposed to the state today where cross-site access depends on how the
>> resource is embedded.
> I don't think this would really work for Google. Many widgets (e.g.
> mapping widget) are expected to be placed on any site, but how could
> widget provider know who is evil and who isn't? What about if an
> not evil site is compromised? (This happens regularly, especially
> e.g., sites with forum software or blog software.) We don't want a
> vulnerability in a widget host site to immediately allow this kind of
> attack on all the widgets that that site hosts.
> Secondly, consider Google Image Search, or Reddit with its "open
> link with
> reddit toolbar" option, or any other site that allows arbitrary Web
> navigation in a frame or iframe while hosting some sort of toolbar
> from its own page in another frame or container page. This option
> mean that many sites would stop working with these containers, despite
> these containers not doing anything evil (there's no overlapping
> the user is fully aware of what's going on, etc).
I did not think of that. But I don't think there has been a solution
proposed yet that wouldn't break some content under some
circumstances. This proposal at least has the advantage of not
involving the layout code in security policy.
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