[whatwg] The choice of script global object to use when the script element is moved
w3c at adambarth.com
Fri Sep 3 10:47:25 PDT 2010
I'm not sure it makes much of a difference from a security point of
view. I suspect WebKit does #3 because it grabs the security context
immediately before executing the script. That actually seems
marginally safer because it means you're unlikely to grab an out-dated
On Fri, Sep 3, 2010 at 3:49 AM, Henri Sivonen <hsivonen at iki.fi> wrote:
> When evaluating a parser-inserted script, there are three potential script global objects to use:
> 1) The script global object of the document whose active parser the parser that inserted the script is.
> 2) The script global object of the document that owned the script element at the time of invoking the "run" algorithm.
> 3) The script global object of the document that owns the script element at the time of script evaluation.
> The spec says the answer is #3. WebKit (with HTML5 parser or without) says the answer is #1. Firefox 3.6 says the answer is #2.
> I doubt that there are Web compat considerations forcing this choice, because IE8 doesn't get as far as running the script in this case. IE9 tries to do either #2 or #3 (not sure which) succeeding for inline scripts and failing for external ones. (IIRC, the text in the spec that explains the distinction between 1 and the other (without explaining the distinction between 2 and 3) was added specifically for the benefit of the IE team.)
> The spec asserts that these options are equally safe, because if something is able to move the scripts so that 1, 2 and 3 would result in different script global objects, the script gets moved within one Origin.
> However, if there's something other than Same Origin restricting what scripts are eligible for evaluation (e.g. Content Security Policies that I don't know well enough to reason about), 1, 2 and 3 might not be equally safe.
> * Is anyone aware of an existing or upcoming security mechanism that would not make the three above cases equally safe--especially if e.g. the security check was made according to #1 but the effective script global object were chosen accoding to #3?
> * Why does the spec say #3 when none of the browsers did #3 at the time of spec writing?
> * Are there use cases that favor any one of these in particular? (I doubt it.)
> FWIW, my gut says we should do #1, since it is obviously secure, except it would be unfortunate if the spec changed to #1 but too late for IE9 to match.
> Henri Sivonen
> hsivonen at iki.fi
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