[whatwg] window.cipher HTML crypto API draft spec

Tue May 24 10:29:48 PDT 2011

Why do you assume I want to access the data from localStorage only while offline? This use case is for an online data cache.

If I wanted to access the data offline as well, I’d probably still encrypt it so that it’s not in plain text on disk.

-Nicholas

________________________________
From: Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) [mailto:ifette at google.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 10:16 AM
To: Nicholas Zakas
Cc: David Dahl; Henri Sivonen; whatwg at lists.whatwg.org
Subject: Re: [whatwg] window.cipher HTML crypto API draft spec

Well, presumably you would be using LocalStorage because you want to use the data offline. So, if you're offline, you need the decryption key to be available offline, which means either the user has a separate device with the key (e.g. a CAC card, not really practical for average users) or the key / whatever is needed to decrypt is stored somewhere on the device, at which point what's the point of encrypting it?
On Tue, May 24, 2011 at 10:04 AM, Nicholas Zakas <nzakas at yahoo-inc.com<mailto:nzakas at yahoo-inc.com>> wrote:
I'm excited to see this get some steam behind it, though I'd echo what some others have said about this being very targeted at the address book use case. The use case I'm more interested in is a bit simpler: I want to encrypt data before saving to localStorage. The key may be one that exists solely on the server.

IMHO, this is an important use case and potentially more common. I'd really like for any encryption API to enable this use case easily, and I'm having a hard time figuring if it's possible with this API. Can you share your thoughts on this (maybe some pseudo-code)?

-Nicholas

-----Original Message-----
From: whatwg-bounces at lists.whatwg.org<mailto:whatwg-bounces at lists.whatwg.org> [mailto:whatwg-bounces at lists.whatwg.org<mailto:whatwg-bounces at lists.whatwg.org>] On Behalf Of David Dahl
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 7:48 AM
To: Henri Sivonen
Cc: whatwg at lists.whatwg.org<mailto:whatwg at lists.whatwg.org>
Subject: Re: [whatwg] window.cipher HTML crypto API draft spec

----- Original Message -----
From: "Henri Sivonen" <hsivonen at iki.fi<mailto:hsivonen at iki.fi>>
To: "David Dahl" <ddahl at mozilla.com<mailto:ddahl at mozilla.com>>
Cc: whatwg at lists.whatwg.org<mailto:whatwg at lists.whatwg.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:25:53 AM
Subject: Re: [whatwg] window.cipher HTML crypto API draft spec

> It seems unfortunate that crypto is only available when a JavaScript
 program explicitly drives encryption. This means that in order to use
 crypto, the Web app has to be written in such a way that all its
 resource handling is programmed in JavaScript instead of using
 traditional browser-handled resource retrievals.

I imagine using resource retrieval would be the way to handle larger binary data decryption, and would be an amazing counterpart to this API - it also seems like a much bigger project to undertake. The emphasis on DOMCrypt is mainly on giving content developers a way to write privacy-enhanced web apps.

> Consider for example a DropBox-style service that has a browser-based UI
 but that has a design where content is encrypted on the client-side so
 that the service provider is unable to decrypt the data. In this case,
 it would make sense to be able to implement a file download by having a
 plain <a href> to an excrypted file and have the browser automatically
 decrypt it. Likewise, a service that allows the transmission of
 encrypted images should be implementable by having <img src> point
 directly to an encrypted file.

I think someone was asking about that kind of functionality during my presentation at Mozilla. Again, this would be a pretty advanced complement to this API - I would love to see something like that spec'd and implemented as well.

> I suggest adding a Content-Encoding type that tells the HTTP stack that
 the payload of a HTTP response is encrypted and needs to be decrypted
 using a key previously initialized using the JS API.

cool. I'll look into that.

- -

> On the other hand, it seems that letting Web apps generate per-user key
 pairs and letting Web apps discover if the user possesses the private
 key that decrypts a particular message is a privacy problem. Someone who
 wishes to surveil Web users could use private keys as supercookies,
 since the generated private key is most probably going to be unique to
 user.

Currently, my implementation requires the enduser to open a file from the file system in order to view the contents of the private key. It is only accessible to privileged code - content has no access to it whatsoever.

> OTOH, wiping keys along with cookies could lead to accidents.
> Is there a plan on how this will integrate into various private data
 deletion UIs in such a way that users have the option to delete keys but
 understand the implications and don't delete them accidentally?

Not yet. There no doubt will have to be a UI that helps users understand the ramifications of deleting keys, etc.

> Are all the methods that take a success callback meant to pop up a
 geolocation-style asynchronous authorization UI until the user
 perma-authorizes a site to use crypto?

It is not implemented yet, but yes, that would be the plan.
- -

> Is the plan to use Firefox Sync to sync the user's private keys across
 multiple browser instances so that the user doesn't need to manually
 transfer keys in the usual case?

I do think so, however, there are those who would caution against the private key ever going over the wire. I think with Sync, it would be safe.

- -

> Currently, it is unfortunate that choosing to use a webmail client
 effectively prevents a person from using encrypted email. To allow
 people to use end-to-end encrypted email with webmail apps, it would be
 useful to support OpenPGP as an encryption format. (Obviously, a
 malicious webmail app could capture the decrypted messages on the
 browser and send them back to the server, but when the webmail app
 itself doesn't contain code like that, putting the decryption in the
 browser rather than putting it on the server would still probably be
 more subpoena-resistant and resistant against casual snooping by bored
 administrators.)

I think with an API like this we might see a whole new breed of communications applications that can supplant email and webmail entirely. "Host Proof" apps like Sync are what we need to move to, encrypted by default is possible with our fast CPUs. As I have strived for a very "webby" API, I tried not to design around existing formats, just going for a simple JSON based message, keypair and addressbook-entry. There is no reason a followup spec could not support existing messaging formats.

- -

> It seems unfortunate that the proposed API entry point is yet another
 special name in the global scope. It seems to me that it would be better
 to put the new stuff on the existing window.crypto object or, if mixing
 with the old object is considered confusing, it would make sense to put
 the new stuff on the navigator object as navigator.crypto or
 navigator.cipher in order to avoid polluting the global scope.

I am not tied to 'window.cipher', and there has been a bit of discussion on consolidating this API into window.crypto - I put the property on the window via nsIDOMGlobalPropertyInitializer, which makes it easy:)

- -

> The public key discovery section shows a </meta> end tag. I hope this is
 just a plain error and having content in a meta element isn't part of
 any design.

The tag is unimportant as well - can you explain why you hope this wil not use a meta tag? I could just as easily use <addressbookentry>

- -

> The public key discovery section is generally confusing. Is <meta
 name="addressbook-entry"> meant to represent an email addressbook entry
 that may happen to have a public key associated with it? Or is "cipher
 addressbook" crypto lingo that I'm unfamiliar with and <meta
 name="addressbook-entry"> always represents a public key plus metadata?
 Without understanding the general design, it's hard to comment on the
 choice of minting special name="addressbook-entry"-specific attributes.

The ironic thing here is that I am calling a public key with additional meta data an 'addressbook-entry' to avoid using crypto lingo in the first place. The simplest way I can imagine publishing my public key is in a web page tag, where it is parsed by the browser, and the user is prompted to save their contact's "addressbook entry" in order to send private messages to them. I want to avoid standard crypto nomenclature when endusers are involved. I think the complexity of just the crypto lingo is what doomed PGP from mass adoption.

So you publish your addressbook entry in a tag on your page in order to pass your public key over to a contact. Your contact also does this and here we have the simplest possible public key exchange method.

Best Regards,

David