[whatwg] Location object identity and navigation behavior

Adam Barth w3c at adambarth.com
Tue Jan 8 21:50:37 PST 2013

On Mon, Jan 7, 2013 at 11:17 PM, Bobby Holley <bobbyholley at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2013 at 8:05 PM, Ian Hickson <ian at hixie.ch> wrote:
>> On Mon, 7 Jan 2013, Bobby Holley wrote:
>> >
>> > Aside from concerns about stack introspection, the main downside of this
>> > approach is that it's a blacklist, rather than a whitelist (like our
>> > other security code), so we'll have to be extra careful when
>> > implementing anything new on Location. Please keep that in mind when
>> > updating the spec. ;-)
>> Can you elaborate on what is a blacklist?
> In the sense that we have to implement it as explicit per-method checks in
> C++. Our regular security model is an object-capability system enforced
> with wrappers across scope boundaries (using a whitelist), which, as
> previously discussed, doesn't jive with the current spec for Location. So
> if something new is ever added to nsLocation, we're going to need to
> remember to add a security check.

The way we handle this in WebKit is with an IDL attribute
[CheckDomainSecurity] on the interface that instructs the code
generator to generate these security checks for each method
automatically.  Individual methods can be whitelisted using the IDL
attribute [DoNotCheckDomainSecurity].  That's all much easier than
implementing a secure JavaScript wrapper.  (I understand that some
existing Mozilla-proprietary features require you to spend the
engineering effort to build secure JavaScript wrappers, but nothing in
the web platform requires other browser engines to make that


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